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Making Offenders Vote: Democratic Expressivism and Compulsory
Criminal Voting
ANDREI POAMA Leiden University
TOM THEUNS Utrecht University
I s criminal disenfranchisement compatible with a democratic political order? This article considers thisquestion in light of a recently developed view that criminal disenfranchisement is justiﬁed because itexpresses our commitment to democratic values.We call this view expressive disenfranchisement and
refer to the general conception in which it is grounded as democratic expressivism. Contra supporters of
expressivedisenfranchisement,weargue that democratic expressivismdoesnotoffer a sound justiﬁcationof
criminal disenfranchisement. Additionally, we argue that, insofar as one really cares about answering
serious criminal wrongs via an expression of democratic values, criminal disenfranchisement should be
abandoned and replaced with a policy that temporarily obliges the relevant criminals to vote. Democratic
expressivists should, in other words, move from supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders to
endorsing a policy of compulsory criminal voting for a ﬁnite period of time.
INTRODUCTION
Most contemporary democracies authorize someform of criminal disenfranchisement. Crimi-nal disenfranchisement refers to the legally
sanctioned practice whereby some convicted criminal
offenders—most frequently, felons—are deprived of
their right to vote. Denial of the franchise is typically
triggered by a prison sentence. Blais, Massicotte, and
Yoshinaka (2004) show that only about 25% of the 63
democracies they analyze let all their prisoners vote. A
sizable number of democracies thus disenfranchise at least
some of their prisoners. More strikingly, offenders are
sometimes stripped of their right to vote after their release
fromprison.1 In Europe, there are only nine countries that
donot imposeanyrestrictionsonsuffrage inorafterprison,
whereas in the US, 48 states and the District of Columbia
restrict it during imprisonment and 31 states keep the
restrictions for persons on probation (Tripkovic 2016).
These pervasive electoral exclusions should make us
wonderwhyapolitical regime that is generallypremised
on the enfranchisement of its citizens should concur in
depriving some of them of their right to vote. Do de-
mocracies ever have good democratic reasons to sup-
port criminal disenfranchisement? Put differently, is
criminal disenfranchisement compatible with or re-
quired by a democratic political order?
In exploring these questions, we focus on a recently de-
veloped view which argues that, when rightly designed and
enforced, criminal disenfranchisement is desirable as an
expressionofdemocraticvalues.Wecall thisview expressive
disenfranchisement and refer to the general conception in
which it is grounded as democratic expressivism. Unlike
various other justiﬁcations for criminal disenfranchisement,
expressive disenfranchisement does not seem to rely on
dubious empirical assumptions about the instrumental
advantages of criminal disenfranchisement or to entertain
morally abhorrent positions that dehumanize offenders.2
However, despite its apparent plausibility and putative
promise to guide criminal justice and electoral reform, we
argue that democratic expressivism does not offer a sound
justiﬁcation of any form of criminal disenfranchisement
Additionally, insofar as one cares about answering serious
criminalwrongs via an expression of democratic values,we
argue that criminal disenfranchisement should be replaced
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1 This happens in Germany, see Tripkovic (2016).
2 Prominent instrumental arguments for criminal disenfranchisement can
be broadly grouped into ‘republican’ and ‘contractual’ groups. ‘Re-
publican’ strategies focuson theneed toprevent the subversionof thevote
by felons (Clegg 2001; Manfredi 1998), and have been shown by Sigler
(2014,1731)andReiman(2005,7–8)torestonspeculative(andempirically
dubious) assumptions about felons, especially about felons construed as
groups (Lo´pez-Guerra 2014, 114). A similarly weak instrumental argu-
ment focuseson thedeterrent functionofdisenfranchisement (ibid;Cholbi
2002, 557; Bennett 2016, 416). A different, ‘contractual’, approach holds
that criminal acts undermine a social contract (Ewald 2002). As Lippke
(2001, 561), has pointed out, this strategy also demands a public-good-
based justiﬁcation of disenfranchisement, which runs into the same em-
pirical worries as republican arguments. Further, Schall (2006, 78) and
Beckman (2009, 125–6) note that convicted criminals continue to be
subject to society’s laws, and thus part of the social contract.
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with a policy that temporarily obliges felons to vote.
Democratic expressivists should move from supporting
disenfranchising offenders to endorsing a policy of com-
pulsory criminal voting for a ﬁnite period of time.
Note that neither expressive disenfranchisement nor our
compulsory voting view endorses the current actual practice
of criminal disenfranchisement, which is often substantively
indiscriminate in its application to all imprisonable crimes3
or, in certain jurisdictions, permanently imposed on some
felons.4On theexpressivedisenfranchisementview, existing
cases where offenders are permanently disenfranchised or
disenfranchisedfordemocraticallyirrelevantreasonsremain
unjustiﬁed. But disenfranchisement for offenses carrying an
antidemocratic message would continue to be justiﬁed, and
thus partly uphold current practice on democratic grounds.
On our view, no form of criminal disenfranchisement is
justiﬁed. Note, furthermore, that we do not directly defend
democratic expressivism. Although we think that it is a re-
spectable position,weare attachedonly to themoremodest
claim that, granted that the franchise is an expression of
democracy,obliging serious criminals tovote ispreferable to
disenfranchising them.This conditionalqualiﬁer is central to
our critique of expressive disenfranchisement and to our
electoral-cum-criminal policy proposal.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin with a charac-
terization of democratic expressivism as applied to the
franchise and a reconstruction of two formulations of ex-
pressive disenfranchisement. The ﬁrst, which we call “de-
clarative disenfranchisement,” has been most notably
developed by Andrew Altman (2005) and William Bu¨low
(2016). It holds that disenfranchising some offenders is
justiﬁedasawayofsignalingthat therearecertainnormative
standards thatmembersof thedemosarecommitted to.The
second, which we call “instructive disenfranchisement,” has
been most clearly articulated by Jean Hampton (1998) and
MarySigler (2014). It argues that disenfranchisingoffenders
is an appropriate medium for conveying the democratic
values theyhaveﬂouted.5Wethenarguethat, evenunder its
most restrictive forms warranted by the declarative and
instructive formulations of expressive disenfranchisement,
criminaldisenfranchisement isnot justiﬁed.Additionally,we
explain why democratic expressivism provides reasons for
introducingacompulsorycriminalvotingpolicy.6Finally,we
offer a rough institutional outline for this policy.
DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSIVISM AND
EXPRESSIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Democratic expressivism holds that, nomatter how you
might otherwise justify them, some social and political
institutions are warranted because they function as
expressions of our commitment to democratic (or
democratically relevant) values. Thus envisaged, some
institutions are not only good for the kind of con-
sequences they produce but also ﬁt for what they say
about our mode of relating to certain values. An ex-
ample of democratic expressivism is Amy Gutmann’s
and Dennis Thompson’s (2004) justiﬁcation of political
deliberation. They argue that, “on the expressive view
of deliberation, signiﬁcant value resides in the act of
justifying laws and public policies to the people who are
bound by them” (22), and that this value consists in
conveying mutual respect for those engaged in that
deliberative practice.Democratic expressivism is “most
often proposed as a way of understanding the act of
voting” (191–2). Thus applied, democratic expressivism
holds that voting offers an adequate institutional me-
diumwhereby the demos can convey its commitment to
democratic values, such as equality, inclusion, and
participation.
Democratic expressivism about voting is a widely
shared position. Elizabeth Anderson (2009) argues that
voting and democratic participation are venues for
“expressing mutual sympathy and respect for our fellow
citizens” (225).Similarly,AdamWinkler (1993)pointsout
that voting is primarily “a meaningful participatory ac-
tivity through which individuals create and afﬁrm their
membership in the community” (331).Dennis Thompson
(2004) underlines that “elections are not only instruments
for choosing governments” but “also media for sending
messages about the democratic process” (24). More re-
cently, Emilee Chapman (2016) holds that democratic
expressivism reﬂects folk conceptions of voting and de-
mocracy, according to which voting “instantiates and
expresses the equality of all citizens” (244).
Expressive disenfranchisement should, we think, be
understood as an attempt to draw on democratic
expressivism to argue that serious criminal offenders
should temporarily lose their franchise. Supporters of
expressive disenfranchisement argue that serious
crimes constitute expressions of contempt toward
democratic values. To convey the demos’ commitment
to these values, the authors of these crimes ought to be
temporarily disenfranchised. Expressive disenfran-
chisement thus relies on three basic premises. The ﬁrst
states that the franchise is an expressively justiﬁed
democratic practice. Second, there are at least some
crimes that convey a rejection of democratic (or dem-
ocratically signiﬁcant) values. Third, it is possible to
design a form of criminal disenfranchisement that ad-
equately expresses the democratic community’s com-
mitment to democratic values. In the rest of this section,
we concentrate on how supporters of expressive dis-
enfranchisement specify this third premise. In the fol-
lowing section,weargue that this premise is problematic
and that, consequently, expressive disenfranchisement
should be abandoned.
3 This is the case in the UK, where prisoners are indiscriminately
deprivedof their voting rights. InHirst v. UnitedKingdom (2005),The
European Court of Human Rights ruled that this blanket electoral is
incompatible with art. 3, ﬁrst Protocol of the ECHR.
4 This happens in eleven US states. See: https://www.brennancenter.
org/criminal-disenfranchisement-laws-across-united-states.
5 We do not consider some expressivist views supporting criminal
disenfranchisement, such as Manfredi (1998) or Ramsay (2013).
Manfredi’s argument ultimately depends on a republican rationale,
and has been successfully criticized elsewhere (see fn 3).Whitt (2017)
showed that Ramsay’s argument rests on an inaccurate and norma-
tively problematic premise, which is that political rights cannot be
genuinely exercised in prison. The expressivist views we consider are
immune to these critiques.
6 This policy proposal contributes to the ongoing debate about
compulsory voting in general and provides reasons for partial
agreement between those who endorse compulsory voting (Lacroix
2007;Hill 2010;Hill inBrennan andHill 2014, 111–204) and thosewho
oppose it (Lever 2010; Saunders 2017, 2018).
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There are two standing formulations of expressive
disenfranchisement—namely, declarative and in-
structive disenfranchisement. These two formulations
differ in their speciﬁcation of the expressive function of
criminal disenfranchisement. Understanding how dis-
enfranchisement can be expressive requires that we
clarify these two functions.
Declarative disenfranchisement has been most
clearly articulated by Andrew Altman (2005) and
William Bu¨low (2016). Altman (2005) contends that “a
democratic citizenry has a collective right to (…) dis-
enfranchise for the duration of their imprisonment
felons who commit serious crimes” (271). This is to say
that the principle of democratic self-determination
renders disenfranchisement permissible. Altman goes
on to argue that criminal disenfranchisement is also
normatively desirable as an expression of the sub-
stantive normative commitments cherished by the
demos. Disenfranchising serious offenders allows the
state to declare its commitment to the “normative
constraints” (269) violated by certain crimes. For Alt-
man, a state that resorts to properly restricted criminal
disenfranchisement is one that thereby “show(s) its
respect for basic normative constraints on human be-
havior” (ibid.). This, Altman argues, is “an important
part of the identity of their political community” (ibid.)
and marks “an expression of respect” (ibid.) for the
values involved in this identity.
Building upon Altman’s argument, William Bu¨low
(2016) holds that, because serious criminal offenders
“have done something that is an appropriate concern not
only for the victim but also for the political collective as
a whole” (766)—namely, they have violated “rights that
are fundamental to a free and democratic society”
(ibid.)—democratic states that are committed to these
rights may legitimately afﬁrm their distance from such
violations. The contention is that “it is possible to ﬁnd
identities and attitudes that a democratic collective may
want toexpressbut that cannotbeexpressedwithout felon
disenfranchisement, for instance, ‘we, as a democratic
collective,hold that thosewhoareconsidered fullmember
(sic) in our community, and therefore may participate in
shared democratic decision-making, should equally re-
strain fromviolating the sort of normative constraints that
protect the rights and values which both underlie and are
safeguarded by our democratic system’” (769). Thus
construed, the motivation for disenfranchisement is to
“express the standard of citizenship that deﬁnes the
democratic collective in question” (771).
At its core, Altman’s and Bu¨low’s argument is that
depriving felonsof their right tovote is a felicitous venue
for ademos to convey its attachment to those values that
are called into question by serious crimes. In tempo-
rarily disenfranchising the authors of such crimes, the
demos can be seen as declaring that, unlike the in-
dividual offender, it is not the kind of agentwho violates
fundamental rights to “life, freedom, and autonomy”
(Bu¨low 2016, 763). The implication is that by tolerating
individuals who reject basic democratic commit-
ments—which, in this case, are speciﬁed as fundamental
human rights—the state could be seen as not taking
these commitments seriously enough.
Although they belong to the same philosophical
family asAltman’s andBu¨low’s arguments, some of the
arguments advanced by Jean Hampton (1998) and
Mary Sigler (2014) differ in their speciﬁcation of the
function of democratic expression. Like Altman and
Bu¨low, Hampton and Sigler support the declaration of
democratic commitments in the wake of criminal be-
havior, but they hold that disenfranchisement is addi-
tionally desirable because it can direct offenders toward
an adequate mode of relating to democratic values. For
Hampton, “expressing punitive responses such as the
suspension of voting rights, have the potential for
provoking thought that can bring about a change in the
wrongdoer’s way of thinking about himself and society”
(1998, 43). For Sigler, “the suspension of voting rights is
meant to heighten offenders’ sense of civic re-
sponsibility by establishing the expectation of restored
political participation” (2014, 1728). Sigler explicitly
links this rationale to the dissenting opinion of Judge
Gonthier in Sauve´ v. Canada (2002), which argues that
taking away the right to vote from serious offenders can
provide a motivational mechanism for those offenders
to understand what losing one’s tie to those values
means.7
Hampton and Sigler think that criminal disenfran-
chisement is an adequate policy for trying to persuade
offenders that democratic values matters for them.
Sigler argues that, suitably reformed, disenfranchise-
ment can instruct offenders to acquire the “minimal
civic virtue” and “shared commitment to a set of public
values that constitute the political community” (2014,
1735). Similarly, Hampton construes criminal disen-
franchisement in terms of moral education (1998, 40).
Both Hampton and Sigler hold that the instructive
message carried by disenfranchisement is informed by
democratic values, in the sense that what is being
(tentatively) taught is a certain understanding of de-
mocracy. Hampton takes the central democratic value
to be political equality or the absence of “natural
subordination” between individuals (1998, 29, 40).
Sigler takes it to be the civic trust among democratic
compatriots (2014, 1728).
Declarativeand instructivedisenfranchisementdiffer
in how they specify their audiences. Declarative dis-
enfranchisement is general, in that the expressive agent
(the demos) also constitutes its audience. Instructive
disenfranchisement is speciﬁc, in that the expressive
agent (again, the demos) organizes its message so that it
communicateswith felons in amoredirect andemphatic
way.8 This difference is particularly salient in Hamp-
ton’s discussion of what she calls the “speciﬁc” form of
moral education, which is aimed at educating and
communicating with the “criminal himself” (40), rather
than addressing the general public, which the “general”
form of moral education does.
7 Judge Gonthier quotes Hampton (1998) in Sauve´ v. Canada (2002),
para. 72.
8 This distinction structurally corresponds to the one Wringe (2016,
42–65) makes between communicative penal expressivism, which is
speciﬁcally aimed at offenders, and denunciatory penal expressivism,
aimed at the political community at large.
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Onemight worry that instructive disenfranchisement
is a faux expressivist view. Bringing instruction into the
picture seems to take us from an expressive view of
disenfranchisement to an instrumental view that
defends disenfranchisement because it tends to trans-
form felons’ antidemocratic beliefs and behavior. If the
instructive viewwere instrumentally grounded, itwould
seem invulnerable to our expressive objections, and
should instead be evaluated on its instrumental efﬁcacy.
However, the instructive rationale advanced by Sigler
and Hampton is structurally different from rehabil-
itationist, preventive or other instrumental views of
criminal disenfranchisement. To be sure, rehabilitation
and prevention remain normatively desirable. But the
main argument Hampton and Sigler advance is that it is
distinctly and intrinsically desirable to respond to an-
tidemocratic behaviorwith democratic instruction. This
is why Sigler insists that her instructive argument is
“formal,”which is to say that itwouldbedefensible even
if disenfranchisement did not succeed to secure the
felons’ democratic uptake (1737).9 It also explains why
Hampton insists on separating her “educative com-
munication” account from instrumentalist accounts like
deterrence or rehabilitation (40–1). In short, what
matters for Sigler and Hampton is that the state acts in
an expressively adequate way when it pursues the fel-
ons’ democratic instruction, even if that turns out to be
instrumentally sub-optimal.10 This makes expressivism
constitutive of (and thus necessary for) instructive dis-
enfranchisement, and renders it vulnerable to the cri-
tiques we develop in the following section.11
If this characterization of instructive disenfran-
chisement is adequate, it will make sense to approach
both declaration and instruction as expressive replies to
attitudes conveyed by crimes which allegedly un-
dermine democratic values. Summarizing, we have:
Declarative disenfranchisement: Criminal disenfranchise-
ment is justiﬁed as a declarative expression of democratic
values.
and
Instructive disenfranchisement: Criminal disenfranchise-
ment is (further) justiﬁed as an instructive expression of
democratic values.
A few additional remarks are in order. First, note that
instructive disenfranchisement implies declarative disen-
franchisement, but not vice versa. Given that disenfran-
chisement is defended as a public sanction, the belief that
disenfranchising offenders instructs them about de-
mocracy canbe held only if one also believes that criminal
disenfranchisement works as a public declaration of
democratic values. If the demos did not declare anything
about its own commitment to democratic values via dis-
enfranchisement, it would be hard to see how the same
demos could try to instruct felons that those values are
worth being committed to. Instruction stands or falls with
declaration, and does so for expressivist reasons.12
Second, expressive disenfranchisement proposals are
doubly limited. They are limited in time because they
attempt to ground only provisional forms of disenfran-
chisement. Typically, expressive disenfranchisement is
presented as coinciding with the length of prison terms.
This is because felonies are usually punished with im-
prisonment, but neither of the authors we examine
excludes disenfranchising noninmate felons during pa-
role or probation if their offenses expressively violated
democratic values.
Expressive disenfranchisement is also substantively
limited to a small set of crimes that convey an anti-
democratic message. What counts as an expressively
antidemocratic crime will depend on one’s underlying
conception of democracy. For instance, one can argue
that electoral fraud or threat to candidates will appear
especially wrong on a participation-centered view of
democracy, that treason and embezzlement or crimina
falsi like perjury or forgery will be singled out by a trust-
based conception of democracy, and that rapemight be
considered expressively antidemocratic on an equality-
centered account of democracy.13 Finally, neither
9 On this account, it is not a requirement of instructive expression to
result in felons themselves consequently afﬁrming thevalue.This does
not render the task of indicating how instructive disenfranchisement
generates good outcomes redundant. One can coherently defend
a non-instrumental view (such as expressive instruction) that is
properly constrained by, but is not instrumentally derived from,
consequentialist considerations. The defensibility of this claim
depends on the more general defensibility of so-called “restrictive”
consequentialism,defendedbyPettit andBrennanas the viewarguing
that“while itmaybeappropriate toevaluateoptionsby thecriterionof
maximizing probable value, it need not be sensible to select them on
that basis” (1986, 439).
10 Alternatively, Sigler and Hampton might draw on Brennan and
Lomasky (1993) to argue that democratic states have special ex-
pressive interests in presenting themselves as agents that respond to
anti-democratic actions with democratically educational measures. In
submitting felons toan instructivepracticeasa reaction to their crimes,
democratic states expressively reveal that they care about democratic
instruction even (or especially) when democratic values are ﬂouted.
11 Note that instructive expressivism does not imply that an in-
strumental account of instruction is off the table. Instructive
expressivism only contends that no matter how otherwise it might be
justiﬁed, criminal disenfranchisement can function as a democratically
instructive expression, and this independently of any instrumental
rationale onemight attach to it. For this contention to be vindicated, it
is sufﬁcient to show that a non-instrumental account of democratic
instruction and education is conceptually possible and normatively
desirable in its own right, not that it offers a full-ﬂedged conception of
democratic instruction and education in general. For an expressively
sensitive non-instrumental justiﬁcation of education simpliciter (from
which a non-instrumental justiﬁcation of democratic education can be
derived), see Peters ([1977] 2005, 63–72). For a discussion of how
education into moral values can rest either on instrumental or on
intrinsic grounds, see Carr (1991, 248–9).
12 We construe instruction as a communicative act and agree with
Anderson and Pildes that communicative acts are “a subset of all
expressive acts” (2000, 1565).
13 Hampton thinks there is a politically inegalitarian aspect to rape
that disenfranchisement could address by making the offender reﬂect
on the value of equality. Allowing offenders who committed rape to
vote is “like allowing the treasonousoffender to vote: it handspolitical
power topeoplewhowant todestroy the foundationsof equality inour
society. Themessage that such a policy conveys is not only insulting to
those values, but also to the people who are the target of their hate”
(1998, 41).
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version of expressive disenfranchisement incorporates
instrumentalist concerns about the goals of voting in
a democracy. On both accounts, criminal disenfran-
chisement is supposed to work as an expression of
democratic values, not as a policy for maximizing
generally desirable consequences (for instance, correct
collective decisions) or, less ambitiously, forminimizing
the probability of undesirable ones (say, social and
political conﬂicts).
TWO OBJECTIONS TO EXPRESSIVE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Democratic expressivism is prima facie plausible if one
accepts thegeneraldesirabilityofdemocraticgovernment.
Other things equal, it seems justiﬁable for democratic
communities topublicly commit themselves todemocratic
values. Also, one need not endorse a fully Rousseauian
account of citizenship to recognize that democrats are not
born butmade, and that expressions of democratic values
can have an important function in maintaining commit-
ment to democratic government. We therefore endorse
the democratic desideratum of expressing values such as
equality (Hampton 1998), civic trust (Sigler 2014), or
human rights (Altman 2005; Bu¨low 2016).
However, despite our favorable views about demo-
cratic expressivism,webelieve that it cannot adequately
support criminal disenfranchisement. This is for two
main reasons. First, expressive disenfranchisement
undermines the democratic values that are central to
democratic expressivist accounts.14 Call this the per-
formative contradiction objection. Second, and in-
dependently of our ﬁrst objection, expressive
disenfranchisement is vague when it comes to trying to
persuade offenders that, in violating democratic values,
they have lost something of value. Call this the
vagueness objection. The scope of these two objections
differs. The performative contradiction objection
addresses the declarative account of expressive disen-
franchisement and, by way of implication, applies to
instructive disenfranchisement. The vagueness objec-
tion, in contrast, addresses only the instructive rationale
for criminal disenfranchisement.
The two objections also differ in their strength. We
argue that the performative contradiction objection is
stronger, in that it offers sufﬁcient grounds for dis-
carding the two expressive rationales for criminal dis-
enfranchisement. The vagueness critique is weaker, in
that it remains hostage to the possibility of a plausible
case being made about the pedagogical potential of
criminal disenfranchisement.15 In the rest of this
section, we ﬂesh out the two objections. In the following
section, we argue that replacing criminal disenfran-
chisementwith compulsory criminal voting avoids these
objections and adequately conveys the signiﬁcance of
democratic values.
THE PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION
OBJECTION
Declarative disenfranchisement is open to a performa-
tive contradiction objection insofar as it undermines the
values it purports to express. The core values identiﬁed
in the different accounts vary. Hampton is worried that
a criminal act can “hurt, brutalize, or damage the
interests of another individual,” in conﬂict with the
democratic principle that “human beings have a worth
that is high—and also the equal of every other person”
(1998, 39). Sigler focuses on the “breach of civic trust
that criminal wrongdoing represents” (2014, 1728)—
a trust that “makes liberal democracy possible” (ibid.).
Altman and Bu¨low state their concern in terms of hu-
man rights violations, and hold that “serious felonies
violate… [the] basic human rights (…) of their victims”
(Altman 2005, 269; Bu¨low 2016). Temporary criminal
disenfranchisement is in each case tied to an expressive
rationale. However, on reﬂection, such expressive
rationales are inconsistent with the practice of criminal
disenfranchisement.16
Strictly speaking, performative contradiction occurs
when the content of a particular statement is in conﬂict
with its utterance. Jaakko Hintikka considers a now
classical example: “I do not exist” (Hintikka 1962, 32).
In this case, performing the utterance disproves the
content of the statement uttered. Our account is more
complex, in that the performative (non)contradiction of
adeclarative expressivist justiﬁcation for aparticular act
turns on the (non)contradiction of the act with the
putatively expressed value.17 For instance, suppose one
wants to expressively justify an act of civil disobedience.
14 Our objections target the democratic values of equality (Hampton
1998), civic trust (Sigler 2014), andhuman rights (Altman2005;Bu¨low
2016), but they would hold on other democratic values, such as in-
clusion or participation.
15 This is not the same as offering empirical evidence about the ped-
agogical success of criminal disenfranchisement. Given the formal as-
pect of the instructive rationale, no such evidence would be required.
Rather, what would be required is clarifying the logic of potential in-
structive mechanisms. We come back to this in the following section.
16 We are not the ﬁrst to criticize the contradictory dimension of some
of theargumentsexaminedhere.BeckmanhasarguedthatHampton’s
defense of criminal disenfranchisement is “inconsistent with respect
for theequal intrinsicworthofall” (2009, 137).LisaHill (Hill 2010;Hill
and Koch 2011) has highlighted the incompatibility between felon
disenfranchisement and an attachment to human rights, or to re-
habilitation. Whitt (2017) contended that Altman’s justiﬁcation of
criminal disenfranchisement is self-defeating. The originality of our
argument comes in three places. First, our performative contradiction
critique is more systematic: because we envisage an entire normative
approach (democratic expressivism), our critique can be extended to
future arguments belonging to that approach. Second, our perfor-
mative contradiction objection is supplemented with a vagueness
objection.Third,weare theﬁrst to capitalizeon these critiques tooffer
an alternative policy proposal concerning felons’ voting rights.
17 This is a slight terminological departure fromHintikka, and similar
formulations such as Lewis’ “pragmatic self-contradiction” (1969,
128–33), and Mackie’s “pragmatic self-refutation” (Mackie 1964,
192).Weare attracted to the expression “performative contradiction”
because it highlights the idea of particular claims being advanced
through particular acts or practices. This differs from a logical con-
tradiction among semantically inconsistent propositional statements
Declarative disenfranchisement is not logically contradictory.
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It would be a performative contradiction in the above
sense to ground the act of civil disobedience on its
expressing one’s commitment to the legitimacy of the
political order. Similarly, our critique charges expres-
sive disenfranchisement with undermining the values
that the act is intended to endorse.
How, then is expressive disenfranchisement a per-
formative contradiction? Hampton grounds disen-
franchisement on the value of equality. Democratic
equality requires that citizens’ interests are treated
formally equally in the political process. As such,
democratic regimes search for fair and neutral ways of
adjudicating betweendifferent conceptions of the good.
A commitment to democratic equality does not entail
that different political views are equally valuable, but
that citizens ought tohaveanequal stake indetermining
what constitute authoritative norms. For Hampton’s
account to succeed, disenfranchisement must suitably
express the value of equality in response to serious
crimes. But disenfranchisement is deﬁned by the un-
equal treatment of certain criminals at one of the con-
stitutive stages of the democratic process (voting in
elections). Even accepting that some serious crimes
constitute offenses to democratic values, it is contra-
dictory to declare our commitment to political equality
via a policy which holds that offenders are political
unequals and that, consequently, their electoral
standing can be discounted.18
To this, one might reply that democratic equality has
limits, and that criminal disenfranchisement serves to
express these limits. A version of this rejoinder can be
found in Karl Popper’s paradoxes of freedom, toler-
ance, and democracy. Freedom requires great restraint
lest bullies use their freedom to “enslave the meek,”
tolerance requires the right not to tolerate “the on-
slaught of the intolerant,” and majorities should be
guided or restrained so as not to elect tyrants ([1945]
2012, 581–2).
This latter paradoxhas been examinedby theorists of
militant democracy. Loewenstein claimed that “if de-
mocracybelieves in the superiority of its absolute values
over the opportunistic platitudes of fascism (…), every
possible effortmust bemade to rescue it, even at the risk
and cost of violating fundamental principles” (Loe-
wenstein 1937, 432; cf. Kirshner 2014). Similarly, one
might argue that expressing an “unlimited” conception
of equality in response to persons who undermine
equality is self-defeating. But here we should note that
militant democratic arguments are fundamentally in-
strumental. They hold that militant democratic
measures come at a cost to democracy which is justiﬁed
because of existential threats to it.19 Applied to
expressivist arguments for criminal disenfranchise-
ment, this implies that the risk to equalitywould need to
be serious enough to justify the cost to democracy of
treating prisoners as electoral unequals. That such a risk
is serious enough is implausible. But even if we concede
that an instrumental threat is serious enough to justify
criminal disenfranchisement, this would not be justiﬁed
on expressive grounds: such a policy of “militant dis-
enfranchisement” would be instrumentally justiﬁed as
a necessary measure for maintaining basic democratic
institutions, with the explicit expressive cost of
breaching equality.
Hampton might alternatively argue that temporary
disenfranchisement is performatively consistent if we
take it to express “that equality does not entail the
recognition of the equal political standing of those who
expressively violate equality.” This rejoinder escapes
the performative contradiction objection, but does so at
a big cost. Thus interpreted, disenfranchisement might
express the absence of a declarative commitment to
equality in a range of speciﬁed cases, but it would not
declare anything about a positive commitment to
equality in other respects, which declarative disen-
franchisement is meant to do. Similar to other cases of
“illocutionary denegation” (Searle and Vanderveken
1985, 4), this interpretation denies the illocutionary
force of the expressive act in question—in this case, the
declaration of a commitment to democratic values—but
cannot, by itself, declare that the demos is positively
committed to equality.20
Sigler’s trust-based account of disenfranchisement is
also performatively contradictory. Here, the argument
might seem more enigmatic, as breaches of trust com-
monly result in repercussions. For instance, if parents
give their child pocket money, trusting them to spend it
responsibly, and their child breaches this trust bybuying
cigarettes, a reasonable repercussion may well entail
denying them further funds. This does not seem con-
tradictory. Indeed, it seems a straightforward implica-
tion of the breachof trust: given the child’s irresponsible
behavior, parents no longer trust children with pocket
money. This objection can be generalized. Persons
depriving others of liberty are deprived of their liberty
without contradiction. Persons treating others un-
equally in criminal ways are singled out from their peers
for penal sanctions.21
As above, however, the performative contradiction is
clear when we focus on the expressive nature of the
18 One response would be to say that the relevant form of equality is
citizens being equally bound by the law, rather than their being po-
litical equals. But equal subjection to the law is not a distinctly
democratic value. An autocratic state can also champion the rule of
law. It is therefore unclear what is distinctly anti-democratic about
a felons’ disrespecting equal subjection to law. Further, grounding
felon disenfranchisement in the expressive value of communicating
‘being equally bound by law’ seems to be a version of the discredited
contractualist argument (see fn 3; Lippke 2001; Schall 2006; Beckman
2009). Finally, the value of being equally bound by the law is already
expressed through punishment itself, raising a doubt about the ex-
pressive necessity of disenfranchisement.
19 See Loewenstein and (1937, 432), Kirshner (2014, 20).
20 Illocutionary denegations “make it explicit that the speaker does
not perform a certain illocutionary act” (Searle and Vanderveken
1985, 112). In Hampton’s case, the illocutionary denegation would be
‘Wedonot recognize thepolitical equalityof thosewhoviolate it.’This
declaration cannot itself imply (nor express) that ‘We recognize po-
litical equality among the members of the demos.’
21 We do not claim that it is a logical contradiction to restrict an
offender’s rights or liberty (through imprisonment) when they
criminally violate others’ rights, liberty or claims to equality. Our
argument instead insists that such sanctions cannot themselves express
our positive commitment to these values.
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argument, i.e., when we take the withdrawal of trust to
express the value of trust. Sigler’s defense of disen-
franchisement is not groundedon the idea that criminals
cannot be trusted to use their vote responsibly.22 Dis-
enfranchisement, in her account, serves to express the
democratic community’s commitment to the value of
trust; in her words, it “afﬁrms its normative identity”
(2014, 1744). In the above example, further funds are
straightforwardly denied to the child to mark disap-
probation at their buying cigarettes. What one
expresses, here, is “disapproval of the irresponsible
behavior”, not “trust” (either in her or in general). But
theact of disenfranchising criminalsmarks out criminals
as undeserving of civic trust—in other words, it com-
municates mistrust. And mistrust cannot coherently be
the vehicle for expressing trust.
If Sigler were to construct her argument around the
idea that criminal disenfranchisement serves to express
the limits of or conditions to trust (rather than trust as
such), she would fall into the same difﬁculties we saw
with the ‘illocutionary denegation’ aimed at commu-
nicating the value of equality by specifying cases that
ought tobe treatedunequally.While such amovewould
save her argument from performative contradiction, it
would fail to vindicate disenfranchisement on de-
clarative grounds: one cannot express a commitment to
the positive value of trust merely by pointing to its
limits.23
Altman’s and Bu¨low’s accounts focus on the ex-
pressive value of disenfranchisement in the face of
“important normative constraints” (Altman 2005,
269)—rights-violations—“that are fundamental to
a free and democratic society” (Bu¨low 2016, 766). The
performative contradiction here is most evident if we
recognize the universal claim to voting in elections as
a fundamental democratic right. Then, disenfran-
chisement would itself constitute a rights-violation and
the argument would proceed on the same lines as for-
warded against Hampton: how can a rights-violation
express the validity of the value of respecting others’
rights? Reading the universal claim to an equal vote as
a human right is a common view, supported for instance
by article 21 of theUNDeclaration of Human Rights. It
is indeed also the view endorsed byAltman and Bu¨low,
who recognize that voting is a right rather than a priv-
ilege without recognizing the above contradiction.24
The performative contradiction objection shows that
the attempts to ground criminal disenfranchisement as
a declaration of a commitment to equality, civic trust, or
human rights (and, plausibly, on other democratic
norms) are ﬂawed. Disenfranchising citizens who are
convicted of serious crimes cannot express commitment
to these values without falling into a performative
contradiction.
THE VAGUENESS OBJECTION
If sound, the performative contradiction objection is
sufﬁcient to discard the declarative and instructive
rationales for criminal disenfranchisement, given that
instructive views presuppose declarative non-
contradiction. Hampton and Sigler however go further
than Altman and Bu¨low. They not only care about the
expressive value of criminal disenfranchisement for the
demosbutalsoarguethatcriminaldisenfranchisementcan
serve to democratically instruct felons. Irrespective of
one’s position on the performative contradiction objec-
tion,wearguethat the instructiverationale isvulnerable to
a vagueness objection. This objection states that the
predicate expressively instructive of democratic values is
particularly indeﬁnite in its application to the case of
criminal disenfranchisement. Consequently, we cannot
rely on it to provide a justiﬁcation for criminal disen-
franchisement. In raising this charge, we adopt a common
understanding of vagueness, where X is vague if one can
point to borderline cases such that neither conceptual
analysis nor empirical evaluation will be able to clearly
settle whether those cases are instantiations of X.
Wethink that it is persistentlyunclearwhetherorhow
criminal disenfranchisement instantiates a process that
is expressively instructive of democratic values. To wit,
it is not clear what the instructive mechanisms whereby
disenfranchisement teaches values like equality, trust,
or about human rights are.Note that ourobjection is not
that the predicate expressively instructive of democratic
values is itself vague. The objection is that, because
criminal disenfranchisement is among the borderline
cases of the predicate under discussion, one cannot rely
on the latter to justify the former.
Instructive expressivists hold that that some crimes
constitute expressive violations of democratic values
and that the felons who commit them can come to hold
those same values through disenfranchisement. How-
ever, since the right tovote is the condition toparticipate
in a practice (voting) by means of which democratic
values are expressed, it is unclear how being excluded
fromthepractice couldhelp felonsunderstand that their
crimes are expressive wrongs or prompt a process that
resensitizes themto thosevalues.Putdifferently, it is not
clear what the considerations are in virtue of which the
predicate expressively instructive of democratic values
applies to the case of criminal disenfranchisement.
Claritymatters here for distinctly expressive reasons.
It is part of the “sincerity conditions” of instructing that
the instructor intends to instruct the instructee.25 But
22 Though logically consistent, this would be a version of the ‘re-
publican’ justiﬁcation which she is critical of (see fn 3).
23 Note also that our objection strictly applies to criminal disenfran-
chisementas a sufﬁcient expressionof trust, not to awider practice that
would include criminal disenfranchisement and pertain to be itself
trust-expressive.
24 Bu¨low construes the right to vote “as a fundamental right rather
than a state privilege” (2016, 764). Altman’s version is initially more
cautious: “One can deny that the right to vote is a privilege rather than
a right, while still holding that taking the right away from felons is
a legitimate exercise of democratic self-determination” (2005, 265).
But he clariﬁes that “the right to vote is not a privilege because all
mentally competent, adult citizensof a statehavea strongpresumptive
claim to the franchise” (ibid.).
25 We follow Searle’s deﬁnition of the sincerity condition as “the
psychological state expressed in the performance of the illocutionary
act” ([1979] 2008, 5).
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neither intending to instruct nor asking someone to join
an instructive process can be sincere if the instructor
cannot clearly identify a plausible instructive mecha-
nism. Absent this, the instruction is expressively de-
fective. This failure is independent of instrumental
considerations regarding the a posteriori efﬁciency of
the instructive process.
As we see it, the instructive justiﬁcation of expressive
disenfranchisement could be clariﬁed in twoways. First,
felons could be indifferent to democratic values, in the
sense that they do not recognize them qua values. This
contention is plausible, but does not offer sufﬁcient
grounds for inferring that temporarily excluding them
from an expressively valuable practice will make them
recognize what they did not prior to their exclusion. If I
do not recognizeV as a value and then I am told thatP is
one of the best suited practices whereby commitment to
V is generally expressed, but that, given my expressive
rejection of V through action A, I am now barred from
participating inP, it is not clear how such a bar will help
me recognize the validity of V.
Second, felons could be assumed to recognize that
democratic values areworth honoring, butmay lack the
motivation to incorporate these values in their practical
deliberations. Here again, it is not clear how acquiring
the practical motivation to act on democratic values
would follow from being excluded from one of the basic
practices (voting) that expresses those values. Whether
we interpret the motivation to act on democratic values
in terms of virtue (as Sigler) or,more generally, in terms
of moral education (as Hampton), it remains persis-
tently unclear how excluding someone from a practice
(voting) that provides the experience of democratic
values could at the same time help them acquire the
moral motivation to honor those values. This would be
like saying that depriving someone of an experience
they have an interest in could, independently, con-
tribute to them properly having that experience in the
future. One does not follow from the other.
Neither of these two speciﬁcations explains how
depriving serious offenders of their right to vote might
instruct them about the normativity of democratic
values. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether, even
when it’s time-restricted, disenfranchising offenders
will not have theopposite effect to theexpectedone, i.e.,
teaching offenders that the demos does not care about
them taking part in democratic practices. As Schall
(2006) notes, “by placing a mark of infamy on convicts,
disenfranchisement can lower criminals’ self-esteem,
place greater distance between them and the rest of
society, and exacerbate the low regard in which others
hold them” (92). Even in cases where it is time-bound,
disenfranchisement might (just as well as it might not)
teach offenders that they are second-class citizens and
that, as such, their exclusion from and unequal treat-
ment by thedemos is justiﬁed. In otherwords, it remains
unclear whether, and, if so, how temporary disenfran-
chisement is democratically instructing rather than
alienating.
If, however, alienation were positively proven to be
a stable effect of criminal disenfranchisement, the
vagueness objection would disappear. This is because
criminal disenfranchisement would be a clear case that
does not instantiate the predicate expressively in-
structive of democratic values. But defenders of in-
struction could not coherently defend alienation. In
denying that criminal disenfranchisement is in-
structively vague because it is alienating, one would
escape the vagueness objection, but would also have to
admit that criminal disenfranchisement is not demo-
cratically instructive.
Supporters of instructive disenfranchisement might
alternatively argue that provisional disenfranchisement
tells felons that other citizens regard them as political
inferiors and thus highlights a dimension of political
comparison felons did not properly appreciate before.
Toput it inRousseau’s terms, disenfranchisement could
be said to awaken the felons’ dormant amour-propre,
which is a source of motivation we all have for wanting
our special value recognized by others.26 This rejoinder
is doubly problematic. First, since amour-propre will
often result in inegalitarian preferences aimed at cul-
tivating one’s sense of superiority, it is unclear whether
and why democratic expressivists should endorse it.
Second, even if the democratic desirability of amour-
propre could be substantiated, it remains particularly
unclearwhether andhowamour-propre couldoutweigh
other psychological states that might also be elicited by
disenfranchisement, such as powerlessness, alienation,
and feelings of political inferiority.27
The instructive rationale for expressive disenfran-
chisement might ﬁnally be defended by saying that
whereas offenders would be temporarily deprived of
their right to vote, they would nonetheless retain an
adequate access to other political rights whose exercise
would prepare them for a proper use of the right to vote.
At a minimum, democratic states should foster the
exercise of felons’ right to access politically relevant
information, to discuss this information with fellow
inmates, and to form an opinion about politics and the
electoral offer in place. In practicing an instructively
oriented form of expressive disfranchisement, the state
should, through its criminal justice system, encourage
prisoners to make use of all these other rights in a way
that prepare them for voting. This rejoinder is prob-
lematic on two counts. First, there seems to be an in-
delible tension between enabling (and, indeed,
encouraging) prisoners to engage in practices that are
arguably expressively thicker than voting—such as
debating political information—and denying them the
exercise of the expressively thinner right to vote.
Second, there are reasons to worry that simple
temporary disenfranchisement policies already confuse
both felons and electoral ofﬁcials about when the for-
mer have the right to vote (Allen 2011; Drucker and
Barreras 2005). It is plausible that the risk of confusion
will be compounded by more complex policies that
suspend voting rights while simultaneously stimulating
the exercise of other political rights. If the risk of cre-
ating confusion is an expressive defect, this last
26 See note XV to the Second Discourse and Emile.
27 For an examination of these psychological aspects, see Lerman and
Weaver (2014).
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rejoinder becomes hard to defend on expressivist
grounds.
DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSIVISM AND
COMPULSORY CRIMINAL VOTING
The above section detailed the reasons why democratic
expressivism cannot justify criminal disenfranchisement.
Nonetheless, we recognize the prima facie attractiveness
of democratic expressivism, as well as the attractiveness
of the argument that certain crimes are anathema to
democratic values such that they require an expressive
response. Not acting expressively in response to chal-
lenges to democratic values weakens a community’s
attachment to those values, since it could be taken to
indicate that those values are not genuinely held. The
question then arises: what is an adequate expressive
response to those crimes that challenge democratic
values? We propose that provisionally obliging such
criminals to vote—at a minimum, for the length of one
electoral cycle—offers such a response and contend that
democratic expressivists should endorse it.
In this section, weﬁrst showhow the compulsory vote
is not in contradiction with a commitment to expressing
democratic values. While clearing the way for com-
pulsory voting as an expressive sanction, however, this
ﬁrst step does not yet provide positive reasons for
obliging criminals to vote. Positively, then, we argue
that the compulsory vote is an expressively un-
ambiguous way for a democratic community to declare
the validity of democratic values. Consequently, dem-
ocratic expressivists have expressive reasons for en-
dorsing compulsory criminal voting. Additionally, we
argue that obliging offenders to vote is (more) likely to
have a positive instructive impact on them, and clarify
the logic behind mechanisms that might ensure in-
struction. Thus, those who expressively endorsed
temporary criminal disenfranchisement on instructive
grounds have further reasons to endorse our compul-
sory voting policy. After addressing some objections to
our alternative view, we end by outlining the design of
the compulsory criminal voting policy.
Unlike expressive criminal disenfranchisement, ex-
pressive compulsory criminal voting is not perform-
atively contradictory. Recall that the performative
contradiction of expressive disenfranchisement turned
on the contradiction of the act (disenfranchisement)
with the values that it sought to express (we examined
equality, civic trust, and human rights). With regard to
civic trust, theabsenceof aperformative contradiction is
straightforward: while denying certain felons the vote
wouldmark a breach in trust in ways that fail to express
the value of trust positively, obliging felons to vote does
not raise the same concern. The absence of a perfor-
mative contradiction grounded on the value of human
rights is similarlyuncomplicated.While forcing felons to
vote one way or anothermay violate civic human rights,
our proposal, which sanctions nonparticipation, while
coercive, is no violation of fundamental rights.
Equality ismore difﬁcult, although here toowe argue
that the compulsory vote does not introduce an
inequality that is in conﬂictwithdemocratic values.That
there is an element of inequality introduced by obliging
(certain) felons to vote is not in question; while general
compulsory voting has been argued to improve equality
between citizens (Lacroix 2007; Lardy 2004; Lijphart
1997), compulsory criminal voting would result in two
unequal categories of enfranchised citizens: those with
the power but without the obligation to vote, and those
with the power to vote who are obliged. From the
standpointofdemocratic equality, though,whatmatters
is equal electoral power, which is kept intact by com-
pulsory criminal voting. Offenders who are obliged to
vote and thosewho are not have a formally equal voting
share. Furthermore, the inequality pertaining to com-
pulsory criminal voting would not be imposed arbi-
trarily: only convicted criminals who commit offenses in
violation of foundational democratic norms would be
temporarily obliged to vote. While the disenfran-
chisement of criminals is non-arbitrary in the sameway,
disenfranchisement creates an additional inequality
that is in direct contradiction with the democratic
commitment to treating different, and potentially
conﬂicting, views equally. Doing so breaks with the
expressive commitment to communicating the value of
democratic equality.
Perhaps though the compulsory vote treats unequally
other citizens, who merely have the power but not the
obligation to vote. Consider the following stylized ex-
ample: in Compulsovo, a state of 200 citizens, electoral
turnout is ordinarily about 60%. When electing 20
parliamentarians following proportional representa-
tion rules, two parties run: the Reds and the Blues.
Polling shows that 55% of citizens would vote Red and
45% would vote Blue. Electoral turnout is equally
distributed among partisans of Red and Blue, such that
Blue ought to expect 54 votes/9 seats and Red 66 votes/
11 seats. However, Compulsovo obliges its prisoners to
vote. Of the 200, a huge 30 are incarcerated. Further,
these 30 are not representative: 80% of them would
ordinarily vote Blue and only 20% Red. Given that
these 30 citizens are obliged to vote, and the remaining
170 are not, the election results are as follows: Bluewins
70 votes/11 seats (1703 0.63 0.451 303 0.8), andRed
wins 62 votes/9 seats (1703 0.63 0.551 303 0.2). The
compulsory voting policy thus has the effect of inversing
the electoral outcome relative to merely enfranchising
felons. This effect (and any similar nonstylized real-
world effects, arguably even where the outcome of the
election shifts less dramatically) seems in conﬂict with
democratic equality.
This objection can be read in two different ways:
either the putative inequality is instrumentally prob-
lematic since it leads to undesirable outcomes or it is
intrinsically incompatiblewithdemocratic equality.The
instrumentalist objection can be countered in various
ways. First, it rests on unproven and implausible em-
pirical assumptions about felons (Reiman 2005; Sigler
2014).28 Offenders’ political identity is not deﬁned by
28 As such, theobjectionbelongs to the classof ‘republican’arguments
for criminal disenfranchisement that are explicitly rejected by Sigler
(2014, 1731; see also fn 3).
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their so-called immoral character (Lo´pez-Guerra2014),
so even on the negligible chance that obliging certain
criminals to vote would impact an electoral outcome,
this would not thereby subvert it but would improve the
legitimacy of the outcome relative to felon disenfran-
chisement. A subtler version of this argument might
postulate that obliging some felons to vote may render
the vote unfairly partisan because involuntary voters
may be more likely to vote for fringe parties, either by
casting votes randomly, or as an act of protest (seeBirch
2008, 122 for discussion). However, evidence suggests
that this hypothesis is false (ibid., 122–3, 125–6), and, in
any case, any proven similar effect would be negligible
in the context of our compulsory criminal voting pro-
posal,whereonly a small fractionof the total population
would be obliged to vote. Thus, the compulsory vote
does not introduce an instrumentally problematic
inequality.
If, in contrast, the putative inequality is intrinsically
groundedondemocratic commitments, wehold that the
response equivocates on the meaning of democratic
equality. A relevant inequality would be weighting
certain votes more strongly than others; this would
break with the core democratic principle of “one per-
son, one vote.” The objection under consideration
turns, rather, on groups being treated unequally. This is
not justiﬁed on democratic grounds, as democracy
recognizes no legitimate pre-procedural group inter-
ests. Furthermore, the ‘solution’ to those posited to be
harmed by this inequality would be in their own hands,
since non-incarcerated citizens preferring Red retain
the right to vote.29 In sum, there is no charge that sticks
against the declarative value of the compulsory vote
from performative contradiction with democratic
values.
Obliging those criminals who have expressively
rejected democratic values to vote would be an ade-
quate expression of a democratic community’s com-
mitment to the values of, inter alia, civic trust, human
rights and equality.We agree with Sigler that “the right
to vote is the relevant currency to mark the breach of
trust because, unlike criminal punishment, voting is
linked directly to citizenship and the rights and re-
sponsibilities of that ofﬁce” (1737–8). The compulsory
vote uses this currency without debasing it.30 The hu-
man right to participation and representation is, by
compulsory criminal voting, not traded off as something
that is granted contingently and must be ‘deserved’.
Felons who are obliged to vote have, through their
crimes, broken with their duties as democratic citizens.
Obliging them to go through the motions of exercising
(one of their) democratic duties adequately expresses
a commitment to both the inviolable right and the vi-
olated duty. To use Hampton’s words, where these
criminals’ actions have expressed “I am up here, and
you are down there; so I can use you for my purposes”
(39), the compulsory vote expresses the contrary,
namely, that we are all in this together. Compulsory
criminal voting thus serves as adeclarativeexpressionof
the democratic community’s commitment to these
values.
Though performatively consistent and declaratively
adequate, our proposal might be argued to be vague in
a different way, and thus nevertheless expressively
defective.DanKahanargues thatwhile imprisonment is
expressively straightforward in that it ordinarily causes
inmates to suffer, alternative sanctions express moral
approbation unclearly (1996, 593). It may seem that
Kahan’s case for the expressive superiority of impris-
onment over alternative sanctions would weigh against
our proposal. However, our defense of compulsory
voting does not depend onmaking offenders suffer.We
separate the desirable expression of democratic values
from the putative desiderata of penal sanctions more
generally. The compulsory vote is expressively valuable
in that it expresses the political dimension of certain
crimes. Even on a retributive penal theory, it is unclear
how the concern would count against our proposal. We
are not arguing, after all, that the compulsory vote
should replace punishment, but that it should comple-
ment it (much like criminal disenfranchisement is often
conceived in regulatory rather than punitive terms
[Altman 2005, 265; Sigler 2014, 1728]).
Compulsory criminal voting is not only declaratively
adequate but also promises to be instructively clear.
Unlike disenfranchisement, our policy proposal relies
on plausible instructive mechanisms. In what follows,
we point to two such mechanisms—democratic habit-
uation and democratic emulation—that specify our in-
structive defense of compulsory criminal voting.
Democratic habituation is a gradual process whereby
a person gains the skills and routines typically required
for following rules of democratic behavior and expe-
riencing democratic values.31 There is no need to en-
dorse a demanding ideal of democracy to recognize that
there are some habits—for instance, listening and
responding to others during a political conversation,
seeking out political information, taking part in col-
lectively signiﬁcant events, or contacting government
ofﬁcials—which are necessary for the functioning of
a democratic polity and reasonable to expect from its
citizens.
Given its centrality to democratic practice, we think
that voting provides a felicitous venue for democratic
habituation. Inparticular, compulsoryvoting canprompt
or support democratic habits. Here, we draw on Ben
Saunders’ (2010) proposal for obliging everyone—most
often, young people and naturalized immigrants—to
vote for the ﬁrst electionswhere theyhave the right to do
so. Saunders’ rationale for a one-off initial compulsory
29 This is somethingwecan assume theywoulddo inhigher numbers if
they felt their interests were otherwise threatened by compulsory
criminal voting (Saunders 2010, 150).
30 Anotherpossible objection focuseson a supposed ‘right not to vote’
that may be violated by compulsory voting (Lever 2010; Brennan in
Brennan andHill 2014, 3–107; Saunders 2017, 2018).Whether there is
such a right is disputed (Lardy 2004; Lacroix 2007; Hill 2010; Hill in
BrennanandHill 2014, 154–73). Prominent arguments for it, however,
are cast against general compulsory voting (Lever 2010; Saunders
2017, 2018) and have little purchase on our limited compulsory
criminal voting policy (Saunders 2010). 31 On democratic habits, see Dewey (1937).
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vote is “to ensure that all potential voters are exposed to
politics and knowwhat it takes to vote” (149). Following
Saunders, obliging everyone to vote at least once offers
an equal opportunity for “tasting democracy,” such that
even if people subsequently choose to abstain from
voting, they “have had a taste of their democratic rights”
(150). The contention is that if we “get people to vote for
the ﬁrst time, (…) they may well form a habit and con-
tinue to do so” (150). Saunders’ contention sounds
plausible: like other habits where some coercion is ini-
tially needed—say, learning hygiene routines or ac-
quiring basic intellectual skills—some coercion might
initially be useful to engage or keep engaging in demo-
cratically valuable practices.
For Saunders’ argument to hold, it sufﬁces to show
that obliging people to vote once is habit-forming.
There is evidence that a single act of voting makes it
more likely that people will continue to vote in future
elections (Gerber, Greene, and Schachar 2003;
Meredith 2009). Moreover, some of the most plausible
hypotheses for explaining why voting is habit-forming
are expressively pertinent. For instance, Gerber,
Greene and Schachar suggest that “civic participation
subtly alters the way that citizens look at themselves,”
and that “the more one votes, the more one comes
to regardgoing to thepolls as ‘what people likemedoon
election day’” (2003, 548). Similarly, Fujiwara, Meng,
and Vogl (2016) argue that the expressive value people
come to associate with the act of voting is “the
most likely mechanism” underlying its habit-forming
force.
In light of this, our argument that compulsory crim-
inal voting might work via habituation can be sum-
marized as follows: given that a single act of voting is
habit-forming and that compulsory voting typically
increases the probability of acts of voting, a policy of
provisional compulsory voting will have habit-forming
effects.Compulsoryvotingwill beespecially suitable for
young offenders who vote for the ﬁrst time and for
offenders who are de facto disenfranchised. Since most
felonies are committed by people around the agewhere
they can vote for the ﬁrst time32 and because many
felons are already subject to de facto disenfranchise-
ment (Burch 2011; Uggen and Manza 2004), many
felons will be suitable for habituation via compulsory
voting.
Compulsory voting might also be relevant for
offenderswhohavebeen electorally activeprior to their
imprisonment. This is because mere contact with the
criminal justice system—from police encounters to
incarceration—has been shown to negatively affect
one’s civic self-perception and probability to vote
(Lerman and Weaver 2014). More speciﬁcally, Uggen,
Manza, and Behrens (2004) found that many offenders
thought being labeled a felon meant that they did not
count as political equals anymore, which in turn might
have led them to voting abstention. If this is true, then,
by expressively signaling that all members of the polity
are political equals, a provisional compulsory voting
policy can push back on these negative effects and
contribute to maintaining (instead of creating) demo-
cratic habits.33
A second mechanism whereby compulsory criminal
voting could fulﬁll its instructive function is democratic
emulation.We construe emulation as a learning process
aimed at embodying another person’s behavior or
attitudes that one ﬁnds valuable in some respect.
Democratic emulation is the more speciﬁc process
where the value underlying the emulated behavior or
attitudes is democratic or democratically relevant.
Compulsory criminal voting could promote democratic
emulation in at least twoways. First, it could provide the
opportunity for emulationamong felons.Given its likely
positive effects on turnout, compulsory criminal voting
would, at aminimum, reveal that there are at least some
felons who can successfully engage in democratic
politics—by voting, but also by competently discussing
the electoral offer, seeking political information, or
petitioning parliamentary representatives. If properly
publicized, examples of such felons could serve as role-
models for other, democratically unpersuaded or in-
different offenders. It would show offenders that felony
is not fate, and that a criminal conviction does not au-
tomatically drive out civic claims or aspirations. Indeed,
some leadership initiatives that pursue criminal justice
reforms, where ex-felons serve as role-models currently
convicted felons can emulate, are premised on an em-
ulating logic.34
Second, compulsory criminal voting might prompt
felons to emulate members of the demos who support
the policy. In obliging the relevant felons to vote, the
members of the demoswould show that they are willing
to allocate signiﬁcant resources to bringing democratic
values to bear on the practical deliberations of those
who have trampled them. Compared to the less ex-
pensive options of criminal disenfranchisement ormere
(re-)enfranchisement, compulsory criminal voting can
better signal thatdemocracy isworth the cost evenwhen
theprospects of it beingappreciated remaindim.35 If the
cost of a public policy expresses its public importance,
compulsorycriminal voting is comparativelywell placed
for expressing the importance the demos gives to felons
beingpersuadedby thecogencyofdemocratic values. In
32 See Rocque, Posick, and Hoyle (2016, 1–8) for a discussion of the
age-crime relationship.
33 Drawing on Elliott’s (2017) pre-commitment argument in favor of
mandatory voting, the idea of maintaining the democratic habits of
factually non-disenfranchised felons could be more clearly construed
as a strategy whereby the state expressively pre-commits to the
preservation of democratic habits.
34 For a narrative of such an account, see: https://www.forbes.com/
sites/laurensonnenberg/2017/08/26/a-former-felon-leads-the-way-in-
criminal-justice-reform/#31e9ac777bb9 (accessed August 2018).
35 One could argue that establishing a legal obligation to vote signals
the state’s commitment to make voting easily accessible. Birch (2008,
7) argues that, once compulsory voting is in place, a generally in-
efﬁcient access to voting facilities would increase the state’s ex post
enforcement costs. If this is right, obliging offenders to vote is a more
adequate policy for expressing the state’s commitment to have felons
experience democratic values via voting than merely encouraging
them to vote, as Ewald (2003, 35) proposes.
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so doing, the demos provides felons with a clear and
steady model of democratic commitment.
The expressive adequacy of compulsory voting
depends on matters of institutional design. On our
proposal, compulsory voting does not mean that the
state would physically force felons to vote or pressure
them to cast a valid ballot. Such acts would count as
electoral fraud, with someone else taking or manipu-
lating the offender’s electoral choice. As is standard,
compulsory voting here only means compulsory elec-
toral turnout, i.e., a voting system that establishes a legal
obligation which is discharged by simply attending
a polling station.36 Deﬁning compulsory voting as
mandatory turnout means that felons would be allowed
to spoil their vote—for instance, by refusing to mark
a choice on their ballot or bymarking the ballot in away
that nonviolently transgresses the rules of the voting
system.37
Moreover, it is expressively desirable that felons be
given the option of marking a positive abstention. This
could be done formally by introducing a “no candidate”
option on the ballot. Because it gives felons a forum to
actively communicate their dissatisfaction, designing the
ballot in this manner is expressively superior to the ab-
stention imposed by criminal disenfranchisement and,
given the live possibility of de facto disenfranchisement,
to theabstentionallowedbyre-enfranchisementpolicies.
Compulsory criminal voting, in short, means pre-
senting the relevant felons with a choice between at-
tending the polling station and incurring a legal sanction
for not voting. The form of that sanction should be
determined via democratic law-making. Even so, there
are at least three expressive constraints that demo-
cratic legislators ought to consider. First, legislators
should avoid introducing expressively questionable
sanctions—for instance, harsh additional imprisonment
terms or naming-and-shaming sanctions that would
engender or compound antidemocratic stigmatization.
Second, legislators shouldallow for a regimeofdefenses
that would eliminate or reduce the severity of sanctions
under appropriate circumstances. These defenses
should include justiﬁcations for felons who fail to vote
because of unsafe, inaccessible, or otherwise in-
adequate voting facilities, as well as excuses premised
on illness or disability.38 Third, in states with general
compulsory voting, sanctions imposed for failing to
comply with compulsory criminal voting should be
clearly distinguishable from sanctions attached to
general nonvoting. This could be done cumulatively, by
adding the sanctions for felons not voting to those they
would already incur.
These expressive constraints leave a number of po-
tentially adequate sanctions open to the choice of
democratic representatives. Drawing on examples of
sanctions enforced in compulsory voting systems,39
legislators might consider a system of symbolic repri-
mands as responses to less severe violations of demo-
cratic values or, when it comes to more serious
antidemocratic wrongs, choose heavier sanctions
like day-ﬁnes that could be directed toward demo-
cratically relevant organizations or activities.40
Finally, compulsory criminal voting should be pre-
ceded by a process of democratic instruction that
engages with the relevant felons through a series of
suitably designed civic education programs. This last
instructive feature draws on a number of alternative
sanctions currently practiced in countries like France,
where it takes the form a civic internship (stage de cit-
oyennete´). These alternative sanctions mainly target
young offenders, but they can also apply to adults.
Typically, a stage de citoyennete´ is part of a conditional
offerwhere theoffender has to choosebetween the civic
internship and a dissuasively long term of imprison-
ment.41 A stage is meant as a reparative sanction. It is
used foroffenses thathaveacivicorpolitical component
(such as vandalism or aggressing a police ofﬁcer) and
aims to remind offenders about the values of tolerance
and respect for humandignity.A stage can be organized
within correctional facilities or in more symbolically
relevant venues, such as Holocaust museums or thea-
ters. A stage is usually organized as amediated dialogue
between offenders and a criminal justice ofﬁcial—for
instance, a judge—and is oriented toward calling at-
tention to the value of civic interaction and peacefully
articulated disagreements. A stage can also include less
conventional activities, such as theater performances or
watching and discussing relevant cinematographic
material—for example, documentaries about discrim-
ination or domestic violence.
Drawing on the example above, our suggestion is that
offenders who would be disenfranchised on the ex-
pressive disfranchisement proposal should instead be
obliged to vote and to follow programs similar to the
stage. The justiﬁcation of such civically minded pro-
gramsdependson their speciﬁc contentandpedagogical
style, and, inparticular, on their readiness tomake room
for critical disagreement and contestation. Conditional
on these speciﬁcsbeingproperlydesignedandenforced,
we think that compulsory voting is a better tool for
instructing the relevant felons about the signiﬁcance of
democratic values.36 This requires that polling stationsbe reasonably accessible to felons
both in and outside prisons. We imagine the effect of our compulsory
criminal voting proposal to generally track imprisonment in terms of
length; in any case, it ought to be limited to,maximally, the duration of
the—custodialornon-custodial—criminal sentenceand,minimally, to
one electoral cycle.
37 On this point, we follow Hill (Brennan and Hill 2014, 144–5).
38 For a recent discussion of excuses in relation to general compulsory
voting, see Elliott (2017, 658). The combination of such expressive
constraints with the option of blank or spoiled ballots sufﬁces, in our
view, to assuage worries that our policy interferes with felons’ char-
acters and violates state neutrality (see Saunders 2010, 150–1).
39 See Birch (2008, 9–10).
40 Another advantage of day-ﬁnes is that they are adjusted to avoid
overburdening economically disadvantaged felons.
41 On our proposal, imprisonment would be replaced with expres-
sively apt sanctions like the ones suggested above, but we do not
exclude resorting to proportional prison terms as a last-resort option.
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CONCLUSION
In this article, we argued that justifying criminal dis-
enfranchisement on democratic expressivist grounds
should be rejected because it is performatively con-
tradictory and instructively vague. These two defects
are particularly damaging to any justiﬁcation grounded
in democratic expressivism. We have also argued that
temporarily obliging serious offenders to vote is better
for conveying the attachment of the demos to its values,
and for bringing the offender back into the democratic
fold. Furthermore, our proposal is, we contended, im-
mune to the abovementioned defects.
We are aware of the practical obstacles that our
proposal would encounter. These obstacles include, for
instance, securing the resources needed for a successful
design and implementation of compulsory criminal
voting or facing the resistance that the proposal might
elicit from some groups within the demos. Speaking to
the question of scarce resources, the costs of our pro-
posal could be reduced with support coming from
voluntary civic organizations and other volunteer citi-
zens. There are no compelling reasons to think that the
proposal will fail to garner the civic backing that would
keep its costs reasonable. Concerning the potential
resistance to the proposal, we admit that its endorse-
ment remains conditional on the creativity and cogency
of the campaigning that will go into it, the quality of the
public deliberative processes whereby its particulars
will be decided, and the strategies pursued in promoting
it. Similar tomanyof thepast electoral reformsachieved
by democratic polities, the felicity conditions for the
reform we propose will not be fastened instantly, but
gradually, and will not be given, but made.
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